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One of the most outspoken critics of D. T. Suzuki’s interpretation of Zen 
was philosopher journalist, novelist Arthur Koestler (b. 1905). Although 
hardly a scholar of Asian religions, Koestler’s interest in the East brought 
him to India and Japan during 1958-1959. As a result of this journey “in 
the mood of a Pilgrim,” Koestler published a scathing critique of Hin­
duism and Zen entitled The Lotus and the Robot} Koestler’s incisive intel­
lect pierced to the core of the matter, and he began to grapple with the 
problems which bother many seasoned scholars in the area. Thus, his book, 
though now some twenty years old, is interesting in that it contains some 
of the points of contention still current with regard to Zen. Koestler’s cri­
tique of Suzuki’s interpretation of Zen, therefore, is a productive starting 
point for 1) airing some of the major objections to the Japanese scholar’s 
work, 2) restating and defending Suzuki’s position, and therefore, 3) con­
tinuing the work of establishing the legitimacy of a philosophical approach 
to Zen, and of D. T. Suzuki as a philosopher.1 2
1 Arthur Koestler, The Lotus and the Robot (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1960); 
hereafter referred to as lr.
2 This has recently been emphasized by Sakamoto Hiroshi in his article “D. T. 
Suzuki as a Philosopher,** The Eastern Buddhist XI, 2 (October 1978), pp. 33-42.
Koestler describes his motivation for traveling to the Orient:
Like countless others before, 1 wondered whether the East had 
any answer to offer our perplexities and deadlocked problems. I 
chose the two countries (India and Japan) because they are at 
opposite ends of the spectrum: one the most tradition-bound, the 
other the most “modern” of the great countries of Asia. 1 did not
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hope for any ready-made answer, but was anxious to look at the 
predicament of the West from a different perspective, a different 
spiritual latitude. [lr 11]
Koestler’s “pilgrimage'’ was further motivated by his belief that the world 
is in a desperate state. Atomic war and the annihilation of humanity loom 
as everpresent threats, creating deep-seated feelings of insecurity. He con­
cluded, however, that the East has no adequate answer: “Mankind is 
facing its most deadly predicament since it climbed down from the trees: 
but one is reluctantly brought to the conclusion that neither Yoga, Zen, 
nor any other Asian form of mysticism has any significant advice to offer” 
(lr 282).
Instead, the European should understand the strength of his own history 
and mode of thinking. “Thus, in a sense, I came back impoverished rather 
than enriched. I felt that I had been put in my place—and that my place 
was Europe” (lr 282-283).
Koestler writes that the opinion held by many Westerners that the West 
is materialistic, whereas the East is spiritualistic and contemplative, is 
fallacious. Rather, the contrast should be made
between two basically different philosophies; so different, in fact, 
that Haas, the German Orientalist, who wrote a thoughtful and 
stimulating book on the question, suggested a new word for the 
Eastern approach to life: “philousia” as opposed to “philosophy.” 
For all the historical evidence goes to show that the East is less 
interested in factual knowledge—sophia—of the external world 
than in ousia—essential Being; that it prefers intuition to reason, 
symbols to concepts, self-realization through the annihilation of 
the ego to self-realization through the unfolding of individuality.
[lr 281]
That philosophy and “philousia” are not reconciled in the East is one of its 
basic problems, according to Koestler. Only Taoism, with its yin and yang 
representing the masculine trait of logic in harmony with feminine intui­
tion, is an exception. Thus, Asian cultures may be characterized as em­
phasizing mysticism, intuition, subjectivity and the rejection of logic. This, 
in turn, Koestler ascribes to the East’s unwillingness to admit the reality of 
the external world. Attempts to reconcile the two opposites have failed: 
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“As a result, conceptual thinking could not develop, and yin had it all to 
herself against yang. When she occasionally tried to pose as yang—as in 
the pseudo-reasoning of, say, Krishna Menon about the seer and the seen, 
or of Dr. Suzuki about tea which is no-tea—the result was confusion” 
(lr 282). European history, on the other hand, represents for Koestler a 
superior dynamic of the mutual complementation of reason and intuition.3 
Koestler criticizes modern Japanese culture, and sees its ambiguities as 
a result of its inability to modernize thoroughly. This applies to Zen as well, 
which he sees as anachronistic and divorced from the moral rigor which 
demands clear definitions of good and evil. Zen is no more integrated into 
Japanese life than the other aspects of traditional Japanese culture, which is 
religiously “dead.”
3 lr 284-285.
4 Arthur Koestler, “Neither Lotus nor Robot/* Encounter 16 (February 1960), 
p, 58; hereafter as nlr.
Zen, according to Koestler, is “as ambiguous as the pebbles in the rock 
garden which symbolize now a mountain, now a fleeing tiger.” Koestler 
also applies this objection to Suzuki, whom he honors (sarcastically) with 
the title, “the Master.”
And why must the Master and his pupils write book after book 
to explain that Zen cannot be explained, that it is “literally be­
yond the reach of thought, beyond the limits of the finest and 
most subtle thinking,” in a word, that it cannot be put into words. 
We know that not only mystical thinking defies verbalization; 
there is a whole range of intuitions, visual impressions, bodily 
sensations which also refuse to be coverted into verbal currency. 
Painters paint, dancers dance, musicians make music, instead of 
explaining that they are practising no-thought in their no-minds. 
Inarticulateness is not a monopoly of Zen; but it is the only school 
which made a philosophy out of it, whose exponents burst into 
verbal diarrhoea to prove constipation.4
Similarly, Koestler argues that “satori” is a “rubber term,” one to which 
Suzuki ascribes different meanings and which he applies to varying situa­
tions:
Satori is a wonderfully rubbery concept. There are small safaris 
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and big safaris. They occur when one solves a koan, or in medita­
tion, but also through looking at a peach-blossom or watching a 
pebble hit a bamboo. The mondos, in which a disciple who asked 
a too rational question is whacked on the head, usually end with 
the line: “at that moment he had his satori/1 Facing two famous 
Zen abbots in the Daitokuji Temple in Kyoto, I asked them how 
long a satori lasts. The first answered promptly: “One second.” 
The second added as promptly: “It might go on for days.” 
[lr 243]
3 Suzuki as quoted in lr 243-244. In Zen and Japanese Culture, these quotations
appear on pp. 16, 17, and 220.
Indeed, the only common understanding Koestler derives from the use 
of “satori” in Zen writings is that it is not cognitive, but rather intuitional: 
“Satori could simply be translated by the word ‘intuition’ which is equally 
elastic and covers the same range of phenomena. There is not more to it, 
but also not less. The rest is pseudo-mystical verbiage” (lr 245).
To exemplify how Suzuki uses the term “satori” ambiguously, Koestler 
brings four quotes from Zen and Japanese Culture (1959):
. . . Satori finds a meaning hitherto hidden in our daily con­
crete particular experiences, such as eating, drinking, or business 
of all kinds.
.. . Satori is emancipation, moral, spiritual, as well as in­
tellectual. When I am in my isness, thoroughly purged of all intel­
lectual sediments, I have my freedom in its primary sense.
.. . When the mind, now abiding in its isness—which, to use 
Zen verbalism, is not isness—and thus free from intellectual 
complexities and moralistic attachments of every description, 
surveys the world of the senses in all its multiplicities, it discovers 
in it all sorts of values hitherto hidden from sight.
. .. This supreme moment in the life of an artist, when ex­
pressed in Zen terms, is the experience of satori. To experience 
satori is to become conscious of the unconscious (mushin, no­
mind), psychologically speaking. Art has always something of 
the Unconscious about it.5 3*
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Koestler concludes that “satori” has lost its meaning to the extent that 
“By modern Zen standards I would be quite justified to claim that I have a 
satori on each of the rare occasions when I manage to write down a sentence 
which says exactly what 1 mean” (lr 244).
Human beings have a need for a “transcendental belief” as well as reli­
gious or aesthetic “peak experiences,” according to Koestler. Without 
these we become selfish and act cruelly. On the other hand, the institution­
alization of these moments as part of a collective vocabulary or as the cen­
tral dogma through which a group defines itself, is always degenerate. 
Our emotional response is translated by the intellect into forms which the 
intellect cannot fully express, resulting in an internal “dissonance.” In 
turn, the intellect often attempts to overcome this problem by resorting to 
illogical or non-logical categories which Koestler characterizes as “double­
think:”
To eliminate the dissonance, various forms of double-think have 
been designed at different times—powerful techniques of self­
deception, some crude, some extremely sophisticated. Secular 
religions—political ideologies—too, have their ancient origins in 
the utopian craving for an ideal society; but when they crystallize 
into a movement or party, they can be distorted to such an extent 
that the actual policy pursued is the direct opposite of the pro­
fessed ideal. The reason why idealistic movements—whether reli­
gious or secular—show this apparently inevitable tendency to 
degenerate into their own caricatures can be derived from the 
peculiarities of the group mind: its tendency towards intellectual 
oversimplification combined with emotional arousal, and its 
quasi-hypnotic suggestibility by leader-figures or belief systems.6
6 Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), 
p. 261.
Double-think is therefore a comfortable way to deal with the discrepancy 
or “dissonance” between the illogical and the logical.
Koestler finds Zen to be like Communism in its use of ambiguity. And, 
since Koestler had at one time in his life been seduced by Communist 
rhetoric, he wants to avoid being fooled again by ambiguous language:
Behind the curtain there is the magic world of double-think.
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“Ugly is beautiful, false is true and also converselyThis is not 
Orwell; it was written in all seriousness, by the late Professor 
Suzuki, the foremost propounder of modem Zen, to illustrate the 
principle of the identity of opposites. The perversions of Pop- 
Zen are based on juggling with the dialectics of history, the 
Schoolman’s on a combination of Holy Scripture with Aristote­
lian logic. The axioms differ, but the delusional process follows 
much the same pattern. Facts and arguments which succeed in 
penetrating the outer defences are processed by the dialectical 
method until “false” becomes “true,” tyranny the true democracy, 
and a herring a racehorse. .. .7
7 Ibid., p. 262.
8 Quoted in lr 233.
The practical result of this “double-think,” according to Koestler, is a 
dangerous moral relativism which may be applied to many situations 
capriciously. This is especially true of Zen, he believes, given the teaching 
that good and evil must be “transcended.”
Koestler traces the non-moral quality of Zen back to the Third Patri­
arch of China, Seng-ts’an, who, according to Koestler, eschews concern 
for right and wrong. A translation of Seng-ts’an’s Sutra taken from Alan 
Watts’ The Way of Zen (1957) is brought in to exemplify Koestler’s point:
If you want to get to the plain truth,
Be not concerned with right and wrong.
The conflict between right and wrong
Is the sickness of the mind.8
This a-morality has continued to the present, according to Koestler, 
resulting in a tradition which is knowingly “rude,” “abrupt,” “direct,” 
and “sarcastic.” Bodhidharma, the monk who brought Zen to China and 
who is considered the founder of Zen Buddhism, is the archetype of this 
attitude. In Koestler’s words,
From its earliest beginnings—supposedly in sixth-century China— 
the great masters of Zen denied that it aimed at moral improve­
ment: “If a man seeks the Buddha, that man loses the Buddha.” 
According to tradition, it was a fierce-looking Indian monk,
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Bodhidharma, who brought Buddhism to China in the sixth 
century. When the emperor asked him how much merit he, the 
Emperor, had acquired by supporting the new creed, Bodhi­
dharma shouted at him: “None whatsoever.” The Emperor, rather 
shaken in his enthusiasm, then wanted to know just what the 
sacred doctrine of the creed was. Again Bodhidharma shouted, 
“It is empty, there is nothing sacred.” [lr 233-234]
Koestler brings other examples of this “cruelty,” citing cases of disciples 
who are hit over the head with stones, whacked with staffs across the 
shoulder blades, and who are forced to meditate with only short periods 
allowed for food and sleep. He is left wondering about the ruthlessness with 
which Master Nansen kills a defenseless kitten just to make a point.
According to Koestler’s understanding of Zen, students are taught to 
put away reason and morality, and to act instead as an automaton, a 
“robot.” The mind and will are to be subjugated to the authority of the 
master. The “one unforgivable sin in a Zen monastery” is to be too logical. 
It is consequently possible for acts of cruelty on the master’s part to be 
“justified” as a response to the student’s logical questions or answers. 
T’ang master Tosu is an example of this. According to a story which Suzuki 
quotes, the master strikes his disciple. Koestler reiterates Suzuki’s justifica­
tion for this act:
The masterful Tosu knew, as all Zen masters do, the uselessness 
of making any verbal demonstration against such a “logician.” 
For verbalism leads from one complication to another; there is 
no end to it. The only effective way, perhaps, to make such a 
monk as this realize the falsehood of his conceptual understand­
ing is to strike him and so let him experience within himself the 
meaning of the statement, “One in All and All in One.” The 
monk was to be awakened from his logical somnambulism. Hence 
Tosu’s drastic measure. [lr 235]
From Koestler’s perspective, Zen admits of no coherent set of principles 
by which to check one’s conduct, making all permissible through the 
ambiguity of “double-think.” At the same time, it is possible to be an 
adherent of this potentially cruel religion, and ardently to defend the beliefs 
which support otherwise repugnant modes of behavior. Since a disciple of 
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Zen must act “automatically” and uncritically (criticism, of course, being 
a rational faculty which must therefore be avoided), the adherent falls 
prey to masters who are themselves less than paragons of moral virtue. 
The student may be asked to “apply” himself through activities which are 
often militaristic or cruel.
Koestler brings two examples of how a “master” may be morally bank­
rupt without facing the logical criticism which would allow his disciples to 
judge his claim to “mastership.” Double-think reasoning allows the mas­
ters to act in certain ways which would otherwise be problematic. Because 
of the ambiguity of Zen, the master would be seen as acting, nevertheless, 
freely. Koestler shows how the two masters in question are granted 
“absolution.”
I was reminded of a talk with an . .. amiable Zen abbot in Kyoto, 
who, having passed through his final satori and graduated as a 
Buddha “living like one already dead,” had just bought himself a 
television set. In Mishima’s novel there is another abbot, whom 
his devoted pupil catches out leaving a cinema, dressed in Euro­
pean clothes, in the company of a geisha. Their attitude to the 
vanities of the world seem to be like that of the alcoholic who 
affirms that he is cured, and that he no longer drinks because he 
needs it, but just for fun. [lr 256]
Lacking a spiritual center with God serving as the absolute authority 
and, therefore, the font of morality, Zen becomes ethically relativistic. It 
may be appropriated for morally noble as well as ignoble purposes. Koest­
ler again quotes Suzuki, whom he calls “the last Patriarch,” to exemplify 
this weakness: “Zen [is] extremely flexible in adapting itself to almost 
any philosophy and moral doctrine as long as its intuitive teaching is not 
interfered with. It may be found wedded to anarchism or fascism, com­
munism or democracy, atheism or idealism” (lr 271). In another place, 
responding to criticisms by John Strachey and Christmas Humphreys of 
his article “The Stink of Zen,” Koestler puts it into even stronger terms. 
Not only has Zen the potential to serve morally repugnant causes. In fact, 
it does so serve. In Koestler’s words,” ... its moral detachment has de­
generated into complacency towards, and complacency with, evil.”9
9 nlr 58; italics mine.
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Zen, Koestler maintains, encourages people to feel they needn’t confront 
the moral consequences of their deeds. It therefore attracts people of 
ethically questionable character. In Koestler’s terms, “By virtue of its 
anti-rationality and amorality, Zen always held a fascination for a category 
of people in whom brutishness combines with pseudo-mysticism, from 
Samurai to Kamikaze to Beatnik.”10 Koestler thus castigates Suzuki for 
endorsing both Eugen and Gustie Herrigel’s books on Zen, and for not 
even attempting to apologize for their role in the Nazi holocaust. He tells 
us that Eugen Herrigel, author of Zen in the Art of Archery (1953), “.. . 
was the star Zen pupil among Western converts both before and after his 
Nazi career. In Dr. Suzuki’s preface written in 1953, to ‘this wonderful 
little book by a German philosopher,’ there is no mention of that past and 
no word of apology.” Suzuki instead talks about the “childlikeness” which 
is the result of becoming “a Zen artist of life,” to which Koestler adds 
“and the gas chambers.”11 Suzuki writes a similar preface to Gustie 
Herrigel’s book, Zen in the Art of Flower Arrangement (1957), in which 
her Nazi affiliation is not mentioned. These serve as examples of why 
Koestler feels that Suzuki, together with the amoral Zen he teaches, should 




This same topic came up at a round-table talk which included Zen 
Buddhist expert, Professor N. (as Koestler refers to him). Someone asked 
Dr. N. “ ‘You favor tolerance towards all religions and all political sys­
tems. What about Hitler’s gas chambers?’ ‘That was very silly of him? 
‘Just silly, not evil?’ ‘Evil is a Christian concept. Good and evil exist only 
on a relative scale.’ ‘Should not tolerance, too, be applied on a relative 
scale? Should it include those who deny tolerance?’ ‘That is thinking in 
opposite categories, which is alien to our thought’ ” (lr 273-274).
Koestler claims that it is because of the lack of rigor characterizing Zen 
that it was possible for Buddhism to become the creed of the Samurai 
warriors, swordsmanship, Judo, wrestling and archery while at the same 
time undergirding the gentle arts of painting, landscape gardening, the tea 




In order to understand the vitality of Japanese Zen in the past, according 
to Koestler, Zen must be seen as a counterbalance to the rigidly conserva­
tive Confucianism. More a statute of social conduct and law than a reli­
gion, Confucianism determined the culture’s “law, order, book-learning 
and convention.”13 It created in the Japanese a culture that represses 
emotionalism, maintains sanctions on the basis of shame rather than 
guilt,1* and teaches self-control as its supreme virtue.15 It is easy to see, 
therefore, how Zen, with its teaching of “spontaneity,” would provide an 
important antidote to Confucian rigor. According to Koestler’s under­
standing of Zen, “The secret is not in the Buddha’s smile but in a simple 
formula applicable to all these diverse activities, the panacea of Zen: 
trust your intuition, short-circuit reflection, discard caution, act sponta­
neously. It is amazing what wonders this prescription can achieve, espe­
cially in a people tied in knots, conditioned to the reverse set of principles” 
(lr 242).
13 lr 242.
14 lr 231-232. Koestler follows Ruth Benedict in this analysis.
13 lr 260.
Koestler explicates the elements of Zen which stand as direct confronta­
tions with elements of traditional Japanese culture:
The whole teaching of Zen seems to be directed against the 
inhibitions and restraints imposed by the Japanese code of be­
havior. Against the Spartan self-discipline demanded by the code, 
stands Po-chang’s famous definition of Zen: “When hungry, eat, 
when tired, sleep.” The traditional dread of unforeseen situations 
is neutralized by springing surprises and shocks on the disciple and 
encouraging him to reciprocate in equally eccentric fashion: the 
koan technique is designed to bring out just that side of a person 
which the social code condemns: “the unexpected man.” In the 
social code, “self-respect” is practically synonymous with cautious 
and circumspect behavior, designed to avoid adverse comment; 
Zen bullies the pupil into throwing caution to the wind, and teach­
ing him to respond spontaneously, “without even the thickness 
of a hair between impulse and act.” Social conditioning leads to 
numbness of self-consciousness and blushing homophobia; Zen 
aims at the annihilation of the “self-observing self.” [lr 240]
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In a similar fashion, Koestler sets about juxtaposing the Confucian em­
phasis on ancestor worship with the Zen insistence that one rid oneself of 
all objects blocking the path to enlightenment, including relatives. He 
quotes Mishima Yukio’s version of a well-known Zen story:
Clear every obstacle out of your way.... If on your way you meet 
the Buddha, kill the Buddha. When you meet your ancestor, kill 
your ancestor. When you meet your father and mother, kill your 
father and mother. When you meet your kin, kill your kin. 
Only thus will you achieve deliverance. Only thus will you escape 
the trammels and become free.16
16 Quoted in lr 241.
Although originally Japanese Zen emphasized a kind of spontaneity 
which was creative in nature and which complemented Confucianism, 
Koestler believes that this spontaneity quickly became an “automatic” 
and mechanistic spontaneity which in turn drained Japanese culture of its 
vitality. Similarly, the spiritual core of Zen declined with its de-emphasis 
on monastic life. The result is that modern Zen—which Koestler calls 
“Pop-Zen” and which he identifies with Suzuki’s writings—has left Japan 
more removed from spirituality than any other nation.
Finally, Koestler suggests one possible way to understand Zen as inter­
preted by D. T. Suzuki which would make it defensible: to see it as a hoax. 
Koestler expresses this point:
There is one redeeming possibility: that all this drivel is deliber­
ately intended to confuse the reader, since one of the avowed 
aims of Zen is to perplex and unhinge the rational mind. If this 
hypothesis were correct, Professor Suzuki’s voluminous oeuvre of 
at least a million pages, especially written for this purpose, would 
represent a hoax of truly heroic dimensions, and the laugh would 
be on the Western intellectuals who fell for it. [lr 255]
In short, Koestler asserts, “It is time for the Professor to shut up and for 
Western intelligentsia to recognize contemporary Zen as one of the ‘sick’ 
jokes, slightly gangrened, which are always fashionable in ages of anxiety” 
(nlr 58).
Suzuki himself replied to Koestler’s critique. This was unusual for Suzu­
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ki who rarely participated in such debates, and indicates Suzuki’s assess­
ment of the significance of Koestler’s criticisms. In an article also published 
in Encounter, Suzuki attempts to show Koestler how the criticisms he 
brings to Zen are based upon misinterpretations, and how Koestler 
“unfortunately, seems not to be cognisant of ‘the stink’ radiating from his 
own ‘Zen.’”17 An examination of Suzuki’s response to Koestler will 
provide a good starting point for a critical analysis of Koestler’s position.
17 D. T. Suzuki, “A Reply from D. T. Suzuki,” Encounter 17 (October 1961), p. 58; 
hereafter as R.
Suzuki begins by asserting that Koestler has missed the important points 
with regard to Zen, and that this has reminded him again of the difficulty 
in attempting to teach Zen to Westerners who have no Zen tradition in 
their cultural history. Suzuki does not “blame” Koestler for his misunder­
standing Zen: Zen is difficult to comprehend even for the Easterner who 
has grown up in the midst of an Oriental religious heritage. Indeed, Suzuki 
asserts that “there are Eastern writers who claim to be followers of Zen 
who miss the same points” (r 55).
Suzuki addresses himself to the question of writing about Zen which is 
beyond words. He puts Koestler’s criticisms in his own terms; “When Zen 
professes to be ‘above word,’ why then this amassing of literature?” 
Quotes from Buddhist philosopher Asvaghosha and Confucius are then 
brought to explain this apparent contradiction:
When we wish to say that no words are needed, words are needed 
to prove it. We are so made and we cannot escape this fatality. 
Zen is not alone in this. Though Zen appeals to direct action, 
words are needed to explain why. So, says Asvaghosha, the great 
Buddhist philosopher, “A wedge is needed in order to extract 
another wedge, and words are required to prove the uselessness 
of words.” Thus we go on forever, and books after books are 
written for posterity’s sake to fill more libraries. It was more 
than two thousand years ago that Confucius said, “I wish to be 
silent. What does heaven say? Do not the four seasons go on and 
all the ten thousand things grow?” [R 55]
Buddha himself is said to have declared, “I have been talking and talking 
to you for the last forty-nine years but in truth I have not spoken a word.”
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This, according to Suzuki, must be understood as a caution not to take 
words for more than they actually are—words. Like anything else which is 
regarded to be “indispensable,” words “are not to be overestimated be­
yond the real use for which they were produced. Symbolisation has its 
limits. Even ‘God* requires judicious handling” (r 55). Thus, the problem 
is not with the words, per se\ rather, the manner in which persons mistake 
words for the reality they “symbolize” is what Zen voluminously cautions 
us against. Being free from the “entanglements” of reason is therefore not 
the same as eschewing reason altogether.
Suzuki continues: in the history of thought, there are no better examples 
than Zen of a system which is free from being “entangled” in reason. This 
freedom is exhibited by the Zen master’s ability to use either logical forms 
or actions such as sudden vocalization, a slap (for which, Suzuki asserts, 
disciples are often most grateful), “or anything that comes handy at the 
moment.”18
Suzuki’s own mode of expression, on the other hand, is one of logic. He 
does not employ the actional approach of Zen masters as described above. 
Rather, he asserts that it is possible to be reasonable even though the form 
of reason is different from (but not “indifferent to”) logic based upon the 
laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. The non-Aristotelian logic 
Suzuki uses is not based upon the distinction between subject and object 
or the distance which is usually asserted between a seer and that which is 
seen. Suzuki argues for what he calls “the Zen way of reasoning”:
According to the Zen way of reasoning which is not the Aristote­
lian form of logic, is ‘M” because *M” is “wor-/l,” or “/I” is 
at once and “not-Ay Zen tells us this from his [s/c] own ex­
perience because experience or fact comes first and then follows 
the talking or thinking about it, and not the reverse. According to 
this form of logic, when one talks about *%” “/I” is “/I” just be­
cause of the presence of “not-A.” “A” cannot be “J” all by 
itself, it always implies or presupposes “not-A.” Subject is subject 
because of object, and vice-versa. The identification of “>4” as 
“/I” is possible only because of its being distinct from “not-A.” 




which is not always dichotomous. We posit it for the convenience 
of our utilitarian thinking. [R 56]
In other words, Suzuki is attempting to establish the non-dualistic 
basis for reason. The law of non-contradiction, which states that some­
thing cannot be both itself and not itself at the same time, depends upon 
that thing’s being itself. But, according to Suzuki’s logic, something cannot 
be itself without being not-itself. When we say that we know a thing as 
distinct from other things, we are only employing a convention of under­
standing for our convenience. In other words, nothing is known until 
everything is known. All dichotomies are therefore a posteriori and 
imply the unity of reality “before” dualistic reasoning, before the knower 
is separated from what is known.
It should be understood that Suzuki’s pre-dichotomous basis for reason 
is not equivalent to an outright rejection of logic. Indeed, the pragmatic 
efficacy of reasonable analysis is aptly demonstrated by Suzuki’s ability to 
reason quite logically in order to point beyond logic.
“Definitions” and “explanations” can never exhaust phenomena, 
according to Suzuki. Thus, we can never totally know a thing in the dichot­
omous manner. Yet, phenomena stand over and against us and demand 
complete understanding, “understanding in its truest sense.” That is, we 
never rest content until a thing is known in its fullness and nothing of its 
characteristics is left out of our understanding. Standing apart from an 
object, one can never attain this level of perception. Suzuki continues, 
“The only way to realize this understanding is to plunge ourselves into the 
object itself and be one with it. Philosophers of Mr. Koestler’s standing 
will laugh at me and declare here is another case of absurdity or ambi­
guity. They may say: how can a man as subject become one with object? 
I answer: this is applying your yardstick of logic where it does not avail.” 
No matter how clearly and logically something is understood, the subject­
object mode of knowledge can never be exhaustive. Arguing logically 
about non-dualistic reason is the same as a concept confronting another 
concept. Reality, which can only be known by “jumping in,” is left un­
touched.19




though helpful within their own scope, are not the reality they symbolize. 
For Suzuki,
Philosophers and logicians are generally satisfied with the images 
that symbolize Reality. It is the Zen man who goes around per­
forming deeds in this most original fashion. His creativity oozes 
out of every pore of his skin. He is “the most honoured individual 
in the whole world.” He follows no pattern of tradition, he is his 
own master and every behaviour of his is fresh and exhilarating. 
He is the real “aristocrat” of Meister Eckhart. He is the one who 
is behind all the stimulating writings produced by “Mr. Arthur 
Koestler.” [r 57-58]
Suzuki gives a clue to the importance of a logical approach to Zen. He 
maintains that at times the urge to go beyond the anxiety-ridden, limited 
life of ego-existence manifests itself as intellectual “doubt.” That is, we 
intellectually question the foundations of our existence, and this question­
ing takes us beyond the point where intellection is adequate to answer the 
question it poses. The “inner urge” which is the source of the logical 
questioning is a form of “doubt.” In Suzuki’s words, “the ‘doubt’ must 
take possession of one’s whole being which finally becomes a non-being, 
and this non-being must be an actual experience and not a concept” 
(R 57).
The question which remains is whether or not Suzuki’s response to 
Koestler is adequate from Koestler’s point of view. Can Suzuki’s position 
be explained in terms of logic which Koestler will accept? If not, do we 
have a case of two views of the world which share no common basis for 
comparison? Suzuki maintains that there is such a basis, that his is a 
“logical” presentation of Zen. How then can he make statements such as 
“ ‘A’ is ‘A’ because ‘A’ is ‘not-A’ ” or “Zero equals infinity,” and still 
claim to be “logical”?
This task is tantamount to attempting to convince someone through 
Aristotelian, dichotomous logic of the existence of another, non-subject- 
object mode of thinking. If it is logic itself which breaks things down into 
“A” and “not-A” and one can reasonably demonstrate that “A” is non­
existent without “not-A,” then the logical approach which depends upon 
“A” being other than “not-“A” turns in on itself as a contradiction. 
Reality would therefore evade logical analysis to the extent that any 
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object “A” can never be known apart from its negation “not-A.” Although 
we posit an object as a limited, finite thing, as Suzuki says, “If it exists at 
all, it is in our thought which is always dichotomous. We posit it for the 
convenience of our utilitarian thinking.”
The consequence of the line of reasoning that Suzuki is pursuing is that 
reality must be understood as beyond the grasp of logical analysis. The 
apparent ambiguities in Suzuki's presentation of Zen may be seen not as 
evasions of a consistent formulation, but rather reflections of the non-de- 
finite nature of reality before the occurrence of the subject-object split 
which betokens dichotomous reason.
But how could Suzuki’s logic of illogic ever be evaluated? Clearly, 
without some criterion of truth it would be impossible to know the hoaxter 
from the Zen master, the manipulator from the compassionate teacher. 
All one need do in order to pose as a master is speak nonsense and combine 
it with an emotional appeal.
While Suzuki does not address himself to this point, there is a criterion 
which may be extrapolated from his position. If logic in the form Suzuki 
espouses claims to be “prior” to dichotomies or (to use another of Suzuki’s 
oft-repeated words) ratiocination, then the thought which follows and 
grows from out of the “experience” of reality in this “pre-rational” sense 
should indicate the non-dichotomous state of reality without in any way 
making such a dichotomy itself. Thus, the criterion for truth that would 
follow consistently with the “Zen way of reasoning” is its refusal to make 
dichotomies. Reality must be expressed in terms of “A” being “not-A,” 
and this must be consistent and thorough-going.
Just as reason of the Zen kind may be said to “follow” experience and 
not vice versa, so its refusal to accept dichotomous understanding by that 
token confronts one with the inadequacy of subject-object knowledge. 
One is therefore brought to understand the poverty of logic through the 
vehicle of Zen philosophy, and left on the threshold of direct experience. 
Following experience, then, the Zen philosophy, when it is “true to itself,” 
can also bring one to experience that which is unmediated by reason.
The potential to bring one to direct, unmediated experience is derived 
from the necessity for dualistic, or dichotomous logic to know objects in 
terms of their negation. Since the Zen way is prior to the split, there are no 
definitions which limit a thing in terms of what it is not. The intellect can 
never take hold of something which is unlimited. To do so, it would have to 
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grasp everything, which is, by virtue of its lack of definition, nothing. 
Through Zen philosophy the intellect is therefore confronted not by 
another object to be acquisitioned as a datum of knowledge; but rather 
with its own limitation. It comes to “know,” in a sense, that reality is be­
yond its grasp.
In short, a statement of Zen philosophy would have to be all-inclusive, 
breaking through the dichotomizing tendency of ordinary reason. Once 
the intellect is confronted with its inability to know reality through ratioci­
nation, it is at the same time confronted with its own inadequacies. And 
this type of understanding, as Suzuki's argument (and indeed his interpre­
tation of Zen in general) demonstrate, may be put in logical terms. Whether 
or not Arthur Koestler finds Suzuki’s argument cohesive, it seems that 
Suzuki has succeeded in formulating a response in Koestler’s own terms. 
Koestler’s claim of “ambiguity,” when applied to statements like “ ‘A’ is 
‘A’ because it is ‘not-A’ ” or “Zero equals infinity” are therefore ill- 
founded. It is not Suzuki’s interpretation of reality which is ambiguous, 
but rather the nature of reality which itself demands this sort of expression.
Suzuki’s position may be used to criticize Koestler, as well. For if reality 
demands to be understood fully, and if dichotomous reason can never bring 
one to this level of complete knowledge, then the accrual of factual data is 
never-ending, never-fulfilling or fulfilled occupation. Again, nothing is 
known completely until everything (and, therefore too its negation, noth­
ing) is known. Yet, as Suzuki points out, reality demands that we know it 
fully. At best, through dichotomous reason one may be brought to the 
limits of dualistic understanding. The knower is then confronted with the 
disquiet inherent in incomplete knowledge, and this in turn may point him 
to the problematic source which motivates the search in the first place. 
At this point, logic of the Aristotelian type must end and “logic” of the 
Zen type which Suzuki presents begins.20
20 This summary may serve as a beginning for a “logic of Zen/' as Suzuki indicates, 
although it is by no means adequate as it stands. Attempts to explicate such a “logic” 
have been undertaken by such Zen scholars as Nishida Kitard, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, 
and Richard DeMartino. Hisamatsu formulates the ultimate crisis of modem man 
in these terms in his powerful essay, “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection” published 
in The Eastern Buddhist VIII, 1 (May 1975), pp. 12-29, and VIII, 2 (October 1975), 
pp. 37-65. An in-depth study of this question or explication of Zen logic is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this paper and would require a full study in itself.
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In his later works, Koestler himself came to understand the shortcomings 
of reason. Although he never considers the alternative offered by Suzuki’s 
interpretation of Zen, he describes the aspect of human reason which sets 
man apart from other animals in terms of the subject-object split:
The self which directs the search light of my attention can never 
be caught in its focal beam. Even the operations which generate 
language include processes which cannot be expressed by lang­
uage .... It is a paradox as old as Achilles and the Tortoise, 
that the experiencing subject can never fully become the object of 
his experience; at best can achieve successive approximations. If 
learning and knowledge consist of making oneself a private model 
of the universe, it follows that the model can never include a 
complete model of itself, because it must always lag one step be­
hind the process which it is supposed to represent. With each 
upward-shift of awareness towards the apex of the hierarchy—the 
self as an integrated whole—it recedes like a mirage. “Know 
thyself” is the most venerable and most tantalizing command.21
21 The Ghost in the Machine, p. 212.
Koestler’s language, employed well after his encounter with Suzuki, is 
remarkably similar to Suzuki’s own formulation of Zen, and may indicate 
that Koestler later took Suzuki more seriously. But he does not proceed 
to the crucial next step. He has, in effect, come to understand the limits 
of dichotomous reason while at the same time employing this admittedly 
inadequate tool to debunk Suzuki’s position. Rather than confront his 
own discovery, he uses reason to apparently extirpate himself from the 
“paradox.” All this while never rescinding his condemnation of Suzuki’s 
use of Orwellian “double-think” logic.
Once a criterion has been set up to evaluate Zen “logic,” the non-logical 
actions and ejaculations of the Zen masters may also be reasonably under­
stood. For they must be equally rigorous in eschewing a dichotomous 
view of the world while at the same time presenting the Zen student with 
the necessity of grasping reality in a direct, immediate manner. A master 
who “gives” a student one thing in place of another has not addressed the 
problem of finite, dualistic consciousness. He has merely substituted one 
limited perception for another. Whether with a staff or a kick in the leg, 
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the master presents reality in its fullness and thereby undermines the 
foundations of the ego’s tendency to break the world down into manage­
able, self-defining (and, therefore, ego-sustaining) parts. While the non- 
philosophical expressions of Zen are not in themselves logical, one may 
come to understand their a-rationality rationally.
Evaluating the genuineness of a Zen master is difficult in any event. But 
Koestler’s attempt to discredit masters for possessing television sets or 
going to the cinema with geishas displays his misunderstanding of Zen. 
No particular mode of acting necessarily characterizes the Zen master. 
There is no preconceived idea of “sainthood” into which the master must 
fit. To the contrary, it is freedom from such forms which characterizes his 
being a Zen master. As Suzuki often taught, only pra/ha-intuition and the 
compassion of mahakaruna motivate his way of life.
The apparent “rudeness” or brutality of masters in traditional Zen stories 
is understandable when the difficulty of Zen is kept in mind. The master 
will use whatever is at his disposal to help bring the Zen student to “die the 
great death.” Because the master sees the suffering inherent in dualistic 
existence and is not himself seduced into believing in the importance of 
proximate solutions, he consistently, and in any way possible, confronts 
the student with the problem. No rules of propriety are more important 
than this; the minor pain of a blow with a staff or a kick, or being shaken 
by the collar, is insignificant by comparison.
As for the degeneracy of modern Zen masters, Suzuki fully agrees with 
Koestler: Zen is on the decline in Japan in terms of the lack of originality 
displayed by those who claim to be its representatives. He points out that 
Koestler’s meetings with abbots who were “embarrassed” by logical ques­
tions is an example of this:
Wonderful is the stupidity of those high-ranked abbots of Zen! 
Why did they not give Mr. Koestler Rinzai’s "Kahtzl” or Toku- 
san’s stick and chase him out of the temple? He would never have 
written the article in which Zen stinks altogether too much in the 
wrong way! [R 56]
Suzuki’s position (often reiterated) is that Zen may easily fall into the trap 
of becoming a degenerate “establishment,” duplicating particular method­
ologies while being untrue to its own teaching of “non-dependence on 
scripture.” To help insure against this tendency, Zen teaches “meeting the 
64
KOESTLER AND SUZUKI
master, kill the master.” No authority—expressed rationally or actionally— 
can be allowed to exist as a point of dependence. Put in other words, when 
the master is “killed” as an external authority, then and only then may the 
master be met. The confrontation, in the most direct sense, is one which 
a student must have with himself. And whatever method a Zen master may 
employ to bring about this self-confrontation is proper. But when methods 
become ritualized, teachings “established,” they become ends in themselves. 
This tendency, so understandable in terms of egos which require conven­
tions of one sort or another to shore themselves up, is degenerate from 
Suzuki’s perspective. Rather, each Zen teaching must be fully and radically 
original.
Koestler’s claim that “satori” is a “rubber term” which is used to express 
a number of various intuitional phenomena, should be evaluated. This 
will be done in two stages. First, the consistency with which the term is used 
within the four quotes (see page 49) from Zen and Japanese Culture will be 
examined. Then, an example of Suzuki’s use of the term in other places, 
as well as his understanding of “intuition” will be considered in order 
to determine whether he has a comprehensive, coherent notion of “satori.”
The four quotes from Suzuki emphasize the following implications re­
garding satori: 1) the uncovering of a new meaning in concrete, everyday 
experiences, 2) an emancipation on the moral, spiritual and intellectual 
level, 3) the discovery of values ordinarily hidden by our limited, dualistic 
purview, and 4) the psychological aspect of becoming conscious of the 
“Unconscious,” as, for example, in the supreme creative moment in the 
life of an artist.
Aspects 1) and 3) are clearly similar. Both speak of satori as a discovery 
of something new, and indicate that this is a discovery of meaning or value 
previously “hidden” in the everyday world. Satori is not the uncovering of 
some “novel” reality. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to consider that 
moral, spiritual and intellectual emancipation is a concomitant of such 
discoveries. On any level, when categories of understanding or acting are 
broken down, new information and appreciation are made available which 
were “hidden” by the former mode of relating to the world. Thus, Suzuki’s 
first three usages are not only consistent, but complementary and mutually 
explanatory.
To understand how the fourth usage is consistent with the other three, its 
context should be examined. Suzuki is not talking about art in general, as 
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Koestler seems to indicate. Rather, he is talking about those elements of 
Japanese culture which have been traditionally associated with Zen. In 
these cases satori is the goal of art as well as religion. Through rigid disci­
pline and concentration, the artist comes to the same crisis as that achieved 
by means of the koan method or Zen philosophy as described above. Since 
Zen itself may be approached from many different directions (Suzuki 
divides these approaches into the actional and the verbal), satori may be des­
cribed in terms of various cases. The example of the artist within tradition­
al Zen-related art forms in Japan is one possible mode. The artist, no less 
than a monk in a monastery setting, comes to “discover” a new value and 
dimension to reality when the dualistic point of view is overcome in satori. In 
this respect, then, Suzuki’s fourth usage is consistent with the other three.
The psychological aspect of the fourth quote, however, is more difficult. 
Suzuki writes that the experience of satori means “to become conscious of 
the Unconscious (mushin, no-mind).” In order to understand how Suzuki 
is using “Unconscious,” various other quotations within Zen and Japanese 
Culture must be cited. Suzuki writes about no-mind: “It is a state of mind 
which is no more troubled with the questions of death or of immortality” 
(p. 74). Or, put in terms of the relationship between art and Zen, “.. . It 
means going beyond the dualism of all forms of life and death, good and 
evil, being and non-being. This is where all arts merge into Zen” (p. 94). 
Suzuki devotes a section of this book to “The Mind of No-Mind,” which 
emphasizes that when one passes “beyond” the problem of life and death 
(dualistic consciousness), one is free to create without becoming “stopped” 
or “stuck” in one place as opposed to another. In Zen master Takuan’s 
words, as translated by Suzuki:
A mind unconscious of itself is a mind that is not at all disturbed 
by affects of any kind. It is the original mind and not the delusive 
one that is chock-full of affects. It is always flowing, it never 
halts, nor does it turn into a solid. As it has no discrimination to 
make, no affective preference to follow, it fills the whole body, 
pervading every part of the body, and nowhere standing still. It is 
never like a stone or a piece of wood.22
22 Takuan, “The Mind of No-Mind,” in Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 111.
This is not a description of a person’s ability to overcome his particular 
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psychological repressions. Rather, what Suzuki is talking about is a basic 
change in one’s mode of being, such that freedom from life and death—and 
indeed, all dualities—manifests itself in the person qua swordsman, artist, 
or philosopher. “To become conscious of the Unconscious,” therefore, 
cannot be applied to piecemeal psychological derepression. It is instead a 
once-and-for-all event in which the “void” of no-mind becomes one’s 
mind. Satori must be understood as the final death of ego, and is not 
reducible to experiences of artistic clarity. Koestler is therefore mistaken 
when he says, “I would be quite justified to claim that I have a satori on 
each of the rare occasions when I manage to write down a sentence which 
says exactly what I mean” (lr 244).
Keeping this once-and-for-all aspect of Suzuki’s interpretation of 
“satori” in mind, it becomes clear that the four usages Koestler cites are 
consistent with one another. How, then, can Koestler reduce “satori” to 
“intuition?” Suzuki often speaks of one in terms of the other. But, as is the 
case with his use of “satori,” this must be understood as a technical term 
within the framework of Suzuki’s interpretation of Zen.
The notion of “intuition” which Koestler holds to be the essence of 
satori is, indeed, elastic and ambiguous. But Suzuki recognizes this also, 
and expresses his uneasiness with its use. Suzuki employs the term to mean 
a direct contact with reality, that is, knowledge which is “prior” to the on­
set of dichotomous thinking. “Intuition” is therefore not the equivalent of 
“acting on a hunch” or trusting to chance, but rather a form of “prehen­
sion.”23 The relation of Zen and intuitive understanding is a difficult one 
to understand. In Zen and Japanese Culture, Suzuki refers the reader to a 
treatment of the subject in Studies in Zen (1955). In the chapter entitled 
“Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy,” Suzuki suggests that 
pra/ha-intuition (which is the Zen type of intuition) differs from ordinary 
intuition insofar as ordinary intuition is still of the subject-object mode of 
thinking. Pra/mz-intuition, on the other hand, has “no definable object to 
be intuited.”24 Prq/na-intuition is contrasted with vijnana (dualistic know­
ledge), “which wants everything to be clear-cut and well-defined, with no 
mixing of two contradictory statements, which, however, prajna over­
rides.”25 Finally, Suzuki returns to a statement consistent with his “Zen 
23 Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 219n.
23 Ibid., p. 91.
24 Studies in Zen, p. 89.
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way of reasoning” when he declares that pra/ra-intuition differs from other 
forms of intuition by demanding not only that something be intuited, but 
that all things be intuited at the same “instant.” As he puts it,
Thus we can see that pra/ha-intuition is an intuition all by itself 
and cannot be classified with other forms of intuition as we ordi­
narily use the term. When we see a flower, we say it is a flower, 
and this is an act of intuition, for perception is a form of intuition. 
But when prajna takes the flower, it wants us to take not only the 
flower but at the same time what is not the flower; in other words, 
to see the flower before it came into existence—and this not by 
the way of postulation but “immediately.” To present this idea 
in a more metaphysical fashion: Prajna will ask: “Even prior to 
the creation of the world, where is God?” Or, more personally: 
“When you are dead and cremated and the ashes scattered to the 
winds, where is your self?” To these questions prajna demands a 
“quick” answer or response, and will not allow a moment’s delay 
for reflection or ratiocination.26
26 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
27 See, for example, his chapter “On Satori: The Revelation of a New Truth in 
Zen Buddhism,” Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series (1927), pp. 229-266; and esp. 
pp. 237-248, 252-257.
It is easy to understand why Koestler misses the consistency with which 
Suzuki uses the term “satori,” since he does not take this special use of 
“intuition” into account. If satori is, as Suzuki has said, “The Alpha and 
the Omega of Zen Buddhism,” then the “Great Death” is similarly the 
beginning and the end of satori,27 and a necessary factor to be considered 
in any attempt to understand Suzuki’s use of “intuition.”
When the more specific meaning of “intuition” in Suzuki’s writings is 
taken into account, it is clearly no simple task for people to act “intui­
tively.” Indeed, such an attempt might bring one to the very dead-end of 
reason which is the “Great Death.” In other words, the ego’s inability to 
grasp reality “intuitively” could be the vehicle by which one comes face-to- 
face with the inadequacy of vi/wana-understanding. Seen in this light, 
Suzuki could be understood as asking the reader to do what no ego is 
capable of doing, in order to actualize the situation of ultimate crisis 
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necessary for satori. Pointing directly, it would therefore be superfluous 
to talk of “the great death” philosophically. Unfortunately, however, 
Koestler does not read Suzuki this way. To the contrary, Suzuki’s failure to 
emphasize this central element of Zen has allowed Koestler (as well as 
others) to misunderstand satori as a finite glimpse into oneness, as an act 
of intuition (as this term is ordinarily, and ambiguously, understood), or as 
creativity.
Suzuki’s writings provide a good starting point for a critique of Koestler’s 
objection that Zen is a-moral. Suzuki makes no apologetic attempt to sepa­
rate Zen from the samurai code or Bushido (way of the warrior), or to 
deny that Zen, having no set philosophy of its own, may be appropriated 
by persons or political movements which, in Koestler’s opinion, are im­
moral. But the matter is not as simple as Koestler would have his readers 
believe.
First, Koestler has quoted Suzuki out of context. Whereas it is logically 
possible to support fascism, for example, with Zen-like thought and dis­
cipline, Suzuki maintains that Zen has a “revolutionary element.” Koestler 
quotes Suzuki: “It [Zen] may be found wedded to anarchism or fascism, 
communism or democracy, atheism or idealism, or any political or eco­
nomic dogmatism.” But Suzuki's statement continues, “It is, however, 
generally animated with a certain revolutionary spirit, and when things 
come to a deadlock—as they do when we are overloaded with convention­
alism, formalism, and other cognate isms—Zen asserts itself and proves to 
be a destructive force.”28
28 Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 63.
The importance of the context of Suzuki’s remark is that Zen, by its very 
nature, cannot support particular forms of government without at the same 
time posing a challenge to these forms. Implicit in the freedom of the Zen 
man is the freedom to accept or reject the authority of a ruler. Similarly, 
Zen teaches independence from external sources of gratification. Since it 
points to a kind of “fulfillment” which is beyond the economic level and 
which cannot be defined in terms of particular political systems, Zen under­
mines the allegiance-gratification relationship characterizing most govern­
mental and economic structures. By understanding the ego source of 
nationalism—self-definition writ large—Zen confronts that ego manifesta­
tion squarely, viewing it as problematical.
69
FADER
Koestler suggests that Zen could be wedded to fascism. An examination 
of his own favorite example, Nazism, will show that this connection would 
be very different from what Koestler might expect. For one thing, Nazism 
played upon the German people’s herd instinct. It was able to manipulate 
the actions of the people by making them feel united as Germans. Zen 
thought, on the other hand, confronts one with the problematic nature of 
individual, nationalistic and, indeed, every other form of ego-identity. 
Suspension of individualism in favor of other more inclusive forms of ego­
centrism is not enough from the Zen point of view. These things, too, 
would be subject to the Zen “revolutionary” spirit. The unfortunate results 
of Nazi Germany’s ability to manipulate people by formulating a collective 
identity are well-known. Clearly, the Zen man would be impervious to this 
form of manipulation, and anyone steeped in Zen teaching should be able 
to see the problem involved.
A second example may be taken from the case of Nazi Germany. Hitler 
promulgated the view that significance in life can be achieved through 
identification with the Aryan “super-race” as well as the elimination of 
mankind’s “sub-standard” people. This led to the brutal slaughter of mil­
lions of human beings whom the Nazis considered “inferior.” Again, the Zen 
“revolutionary” spirit would confront these claims. An ego-identity, no 
matter how large or militarily powerful, can never bring one to the ultimate 
fulfillment which, from the Zen point of view, egolessness alone can ac­
complish. For Zen, human fulfillment is not defined in relation to other 
rival claims or systems. There is no justification, therefore, for attempting 
to find fulfillment at the expense of other individuals or groups of people. 
Since Zen is free from particular nationalistic claims, one nation cannot 
attempt to annihilate another in order to find its own ultimate significance. 
A student of Zen would know that Hitler’s madness was destined to be. 
in the final analysis, unfulfilling and unfulfilled. For, even had Germany 
succeeded, the “super-race” would be as much a problem to itself as would 
any other aspect of self-definition.
Koestler recoils at Professor N.’s suggestion that Hitler was “silly.” It is 
preferable, he believes, to label Hitler “evil” and “damn” his memory. The 
depth of Zen tolerance which refuses to differentiate between good and 
bad, the oppressor and oppressed, is understandably irritating to someone 
who is so emotionally involved with this extreme case of human injustice. 
But much as the folly of Hitler’s attempt to find ultimate fulfillment 
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through the “master-race” may be understood from the Zen point of view, 
so the Zen perspective recognizes the underlying problem which manifests 
itself in Hitler’s maniacal thoughts and deeds to be an ego problem. Hitler 
was tied up in the inherent contradiction of dualistic self-consciousness 
which is the predicament of every other ego. His actions reflect this predica­
ment, and betoken to an extreme the generalized human situation. When 
the problematic nature of his actions is thus understood, compassion 
should replace anger. And what prevents one from reacting to Hitler with 
the compassion his confused and pathetic state deserves, is one’s own ego­
stake. Since Hitler was such a threat to the existence and self-definition of so 
many people, it is understandably difficult to react even to his memory 
dispassionately. But this is what Zen demands.
When seen from Suzuki’s point of view, there is great irony in Koestler’s 
criticism of Zen. Koestler’s passion is itself devoid of compassion. His 
moralistic fervour brutally turns on Nazism and such Nazis as Hitler. 
Because Koestler believes that his own notion of morality is correct, he 
can criticize Zen for not sharing it. But doesn’t Koestler’s position manifest 
the same inherent ego-problem as Hitler’s—although, certainly, more 
benevolently? Potentially, Koestler could easily begin a crusade for his 
brand of “morality.” At one point in his life, that meant a crusade for 
Leninist communism. At another point, it was expressed in ardent support 
of democracy. Most recently, it means refusal to deal with political ques­
tions at all.
Being attached to particular moral points of view, the tendency is to 
define oneself through them. Defining oneself through them, the tendency 
is to accept them oftentimes uncritically or through Orwellian “double­
think.” The way to insure that one’s moral integrity is maintained, there­
fore, cannot be, as Koestler suggests, through the espousal of a particular 
standard of right and wrong which is defined and defended by logical 
arguments. Hitler, after all, attempted to present the world with a tight 
argument from evolution to support his platform, and one in which he 
fully believed. Moral integrity instead seems to demand that people divest 
themselves of the ego-interests which ensnare them. They would then, 
and only then, be free to accept or reject systems of government and eco­
nomics without jaundiced critical perspectives, to accept or reject particular 
codes of ethics, and to manifest the tolerance and “compassion” which 
alone can avoid the conflict which motivates the forces of “right,” however 
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defined, to overcome and obliterate their “opponents.” This divesting of 
self-interests must be thorough-going and complete. It entails ego-death, 
which is the “Alpha and Omega of Zen.”
Clearly then, there are considerable moral implications in Suzuki’s 
interpretation of Zen.29 But Suzuki prefers to deal with the “prior” ques­
tion first. Put in other words, the relative problem of good-and-bad must be 
held off until the problematic root-source of human actions is “purified.” 
Once this is accomplished, the cause of moral depravity will also have been 
eliminated. Far from being devoid of moral conscience, Buddhism, as 
Suzuki often pointed out, is supported by the dual (and mutually inclusive) 
concepts of prajna (supreme knowledge), and mahakaruna (supreme com­
passion). But in order to manifest true “compassion,” one must “tran­
scend” the dichotomous worldview in which good and evil are opposed.
29 Again, it would be an important task to detail these implications, but one beyond 
the scope of this paper.
30 See, for example, Suzuki's description throughout The Training of the Zen 
Monk (1934).
31 lr 260.
Koestler’s criticisms that Zen in Japan was a non-rigorous, ambivalent 
counterbalance to the rigid and stifling teachings of Confucianism is 
simply mistaken. In its formal aspect, Zen is extremely demanding, as 
monastery life exhibits.30 Whether in or out of the monastery, however, 
Zen requires the disciple’s one-pointed focus and unflagging concentra­
tion. It directs the ego where the ego does not want to be: to a final con­
frontation with itself as the source and substance of its most basic problem. 
Every time the ego attempts to place the blame elsewhere or find fulfillment 
externally, Zen takes that away. Such a task is by no means easy. The 
master’s spontaneity and freedom come after the most gruelling and self­
disciplined struggle. Short of that struggle, there is no satori. Short of 
satori, there is no Zen.
Is Zen a hoax? And does Suzuki resemble Lewis Carroll’s Tweedledum 
and Tweedledee, as Koestler suggests?31 Perhaps, in the sense that Suzuki 
is talking about reason that negates itself, a morality which is no-morality 
and Zen teachings which are no-teachings. But if Zen is a hoax, it is a 
hoax which demands in no uncertain terms that we be able to laugh with 
absolute freedom at life-and-death.
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